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Abstract
We draw on the Institutional Grammar Tool's rule types to em-
pirically analyze the design of four major procedural regulatory 
instruments in the 27 member states of the European Union and 
the UK. They are: consultation, regulatory impact assessment, 
freedom of information, and the Ombudsman. By adopting the 
Institutional Grammar Tool as conceptual lens we end up with 
a single measurement template applicable to a variety of action 
situations. We derive measures that are conceptually robust and 
suitable for comparative analysis. With original data gathered on 
the official legal base in the 28 cases, we carry out principal com-
ponents analysis. We identify design patterns across countries 
and instruments; the specialization of each instrument in terms 
of rule type; and the components that best explain cross- country 
variation. In the conclusions we argue that to reframe the de-
sign features of the four instruments in conceptual, theoretical 
categories is not simply a taxonomical exercise but it extends to 
the territory of comparative policy analysis, practice and reform.
K E Y W O R D S
institutional grammar tool, policy design, policy instruments, regulation
INTRODUCTION
Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom's (1995) Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT) conceptualizes and makes 
operational the fundamental intuitions of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. It 
provides a grammar based on the syntax of institutional statements and a set of rules differentiated 
by their semantics (Ostrom, 2005, p. 180). In the last decade, there has been a proliferation of studies 
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informed by the IGT, often dedicated to the detailed examination of textual configurations found in 
policy documents and, in some rare cases, legislation. Most of the studies published so far are empirical 
and methodological, few are theoretical (for two recent reviews see Dunlop et al., 2019; Siddiki et al., 
2020).
As shown by a recent literature review (Dunlop et al., 2019), IGT applications can be micro (analyses 
of statements included in institutional arrangements following Ostrom's institutional grammar ADICO 
[Attribute (A), Deontic (D), aIm (I), Condition (C), and Or else (O)]) or meso. Meso applications are 
not concerned with breaking down myriads of statements to their grammatical components but with 
the meso- level constructs of typologies based on the classification of rules' aims. The micro approach 
is typically limited to one setting, be it one community, or one law. Studies within this approach are 
mostly computational and descriptive, and geared toward the identification and systematic grammatical 
analysis of large numbers of institutional statements. Applications at the meso- level of rule types are 
quite rare though arguably more promising in terms of comparative analytical leverage (Dunlop et al., 
2019; Espinosa, 2015).
Our analytical efforts are indeed focused on the meso approach which categorizes institutional rules 
into seven rule types— position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information, payoff, and scope. This ty-
pology is based on the different aims of institutional statements, standing as a generalization of ADICO 
(recall that “aIm” is one of the syntactic components of institutional statements) that allows for the 
reconstruction of action situations. In fact, “[r]ules are part of the underlying structure that constitute 
a single- action situation or a series of them” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 179). In Ostrom's words, rule type cate-
gorization is “[…] a way of consistently grouping rules so that the analysis of rule systems can be made 
much more cumulative” and, we add, comparative (Ostrom, 2005, 175).
We bring in rule types to empirically analyze the structure and content of four major rulemaking in-
struments deployed by the 27 European Union (EU) governments and the UK. They are the following: 
consultation (notice and comment in US parlance), regulatory impact assessment (RIA), freedom of in-
formation (FOI), and the Ombudsman. These instruments lay down “rules to make rules” (see Radaelli, 
2010a on meta- regulation). We focus on these four specifically, rather than, say, inter- institutional ar-
rangements or guidance on legislative drafting, because they are relational instruments that bring in 
and enfranchise stakeholders, experts, and the public at large. This focus on rule types enables us to 
capture and compare the structure and relational attributes of the four action situations generated by 
each instrument.
We contribute to the IGT meso- level applications by showing how it can be applied to a relatively 
large number of cases, that is four rulemaking instruments across 28 countries. Considering that each 
instrument is anchored to a legal base comprising laws, regulations and guidance documents, the em-
pirical base is vast. Our choice to work with rule types over ADICO (for more see Introduction to this 
special issue) reflects the limitations of conducting a syntactic analysis of four sets of legislation and/or 
guidelines for procedures in 28 countries in more than 20 languages that goes beyond computing the 
frequencies of ADICO components.
We also contribute to literature on policy designs (Carter et al., 2016; Siddiki et al., 2011) drawing on 
the IGT to make comparisons at three levels: rule types, instruments, and countries. We identify design 
patterns across countries and instruments; the “specialization” of each instrument in terms of rule type; 
and the components that best explain cross- country variation. This IGT- inspired contribution on reg-
ulation is original. No study has examined these instruments and procedures together (with or without 
the IGT). We demonstrate the agility and adaptability of the IGT to different research questions, bring-
ing the analysis to a level of granularity that is not achieved by conventional propositions about families 
of countries and legal traditions.
This takes us to our final contribution. Exactly because we adopt the IGT as the conceptual lens to 
view a variety of action situations, we are able to derive measures that are conceptually robust and suit-
able for the comparative analysis of policy designs. The categorization of rules benefits policy analysis 
at large, that is, beyond the empirical realms where they were first conceptualized and deployed. This is 
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because rule types draw on the universality of language (including, clearly, institutional language) and 
meaning to reduce and organize the virtually infinite empirical diversity and complexity that character-
izes institutional action.
To illustrate: regardless of how rules regulating the access to common pool resources or to consulta-
tion procedures manifest themselves empirically, conceptualizing them as boundary rules enables useful 
comparisons not of the rule themselves1 but of the action situations they shape and of the overall rule 
configuration within action situations. As such, empirical applications are potentially limitless. For the 
policy analyst, rule types have the same guiding function as anatomy books for medical doctors. Every 
patient has two knees, the anatomy book describes knees in general so that a medical doctor can recog-
nize them across a vast array of patients (action situations), although no knees are empirically the same. 
Yet, the recognition of functional similarity within diversity allows for diagnosing the pathologies and 
the success of the overall configurations.
In the remainder, we present: (a) the motivation behind our approach, (b) the research questions, (c) 
the original data used to address them, and (d) our analysis. We conclude with reflections on the poten-
tial of our analysis and how it can be exploited. We argue that to reframe the design features of the four 
instruments in conceptual, theoretical categories is not simply a taxonomical exercise but it extends to 
the territory of practice and reform.
PROCEDURAL REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS AS 
ACTION SITUATIONS
For scholars of policy design, regulatory- procedural policy instruments present three formidable prob-
lems. First, there is the challenge of concept formation. How does our choice of a concept match the 
selection of the policy instruments? For more than two decades, international organizations and gov-
ernments have promoted the so- called “better regulation” agenda (on the EU see Listorti et al., 2019; 
OECD, 2019). Social scientists have studied the adoption, instruments, implementation, and indica-
tors of this agenda (Bozzini & Smismans, 2016; Radaelli, 2005, 2020; Wiener, 2007). Yet, the concep-
tual extension and intension of “better regulation” do not necessarily match social scientific standards. 
Concept formation should come from a theoretical (as opposed to descriptive) approach. We cannot 
expect international organizations to do this.
The IGT allows us to go beyond the labels of our four instruments. By putting them under the same 
theoretical lens (IGT's rule types), we “see” their empirical manifestations as designs of four distinct but 
interrelated action situations. The nature of this interrelation lies in what these procedural action situ-
ations do: they constrain governments and regulators and hence enfranchise public interests in public 
policy- making. More precisely, these constraints and obligations stipulate that: new primary or second-
ary legislation require a process of consultation and an impact assessment of the proposal; individuals 
can obtain access to the process via FOI requests; and, finally, the Ombudsman can represent interests 
potentially infringed by an administrative decision.
After concept formation we have to tackle measurement. To measure policy designs we need in-
dicators. International organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) provide cross- country regulatory performance measures 
(https://rulem aking.world bank.org/; OECD, 2019). There are also regulatory indicators produced by 
political scientists, notably the effort to capture density and intensity of regulation (Knill et al., 2012). 
Measurement should be aligned with concept formation and theory. It should not be sensitive to the id-
iosyncratic characteristics of the individual instrument or political system. The World Bank and OECD 
indicators of rulemaking are mainly descriptive.
The final problem concerns research design. How can we compare the different design architec-
tures? How can we dissect their structure and relationships? The solution to these problems starts from 
a transparent definition of what we put into the box of “regulatory procedural instruments,” or “better 
regulation.” Different choices are legitimate, including the choices made by international organizations 
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that have promoted the “better regulation” agenda. Our choice is not to use “better regulation” because 
it is a value- laden category and does not usually include access to information and the Ombudsman. We 
identify conceptually the policy instruments that define action situations that have a family resemblance 
(Maggetti et al., 2012, Chapter 2). They are not nested (although consultation is often included in impact 
assessment), but they share the above- mentioned properties of constraining bureaucratic action and 
enfranchising diffused interests through participation and transparency.
Let us take a closer look at the four instruments.
The aim of consultation is to bring evidence to bear at the stage of policy formulation (yet again, 
primary and/or secondary legislation, depending on the country). It pushes governments and regula-
tors to take into account the evidence- based input from stakeholders and citizens. There is significant 
variation on how consultation is carried out in the EU (Bunea, 2016) and across its member states. A 
first difference is whether consultation happens at an early or later stage in the development of laws and 
regulations. The latter is more common in the EU (OECD, 2019). There is also cross- country variation 
about whether consultation is mandatory or not. There are in fact European countries in which public 
bodies have close informal contacts with specialized interests. Hearings have characterized the policy 
process of Northern countries for a long time. In others, formal consultation procedures appeared in 
the last 25 years, with the diffusion of the OECD principles of regulatory quality and the emergence of 
an EU- policy in this domain (De Francesco, 2013).
RIA is an evidence- based procedure that prescribes a set of tests and analyses on proposed legislation 
(primary and/or secondary). RIA informs on how stakeholders are likely to be affected by the policy 
proposal under consideration. In some cases, governments and regulators must also report the likely 
impacts on the environment, trade, human rights, and gender. Thus, RIA is an integrated procedure 
involving different analytical and consultive steps. Once these procedural steps of RIA are carried out, 
policy problems and objectives, data, and expert and stakeholder opinions are coalesced in a single doc-
ument. Out of 28, 26 countries have a formal requirement to conduct a RIA to inform the development 
of primary legislation. Among the 28 cases, 16 require RIA for secondary legislation (OECD, 2019). 
In the USA, by contrast, only regulations proposed by federal executive agencies are subject to impact 
assessment. Further, while t in Canada and the USA RIA revolves around varieties of cost- benefit anal-
ysis, the European approach is more diverse and cost- benefit analysis sits alongside other techniques. 
Finally, in the USA the RIA is published for notice and comment. In the EU, instead, there is more 
variety (on transatlantic differences, see Strauss et al., 2008).
FOI procedures are our third action situation. FOI is widely recognized across the world as a hall-
mark of transparent government (indeed, each year there is an International Day for Universal Access 
to Information [IDUAI; Unesco, 2016] to further promote the FOI cause). Dating back over 250 years, 
over half of the worlds' FOI laws have been adopted in the past two decades— a trend that has been 
stimulated by pressure from civil society, international and donor organizations (Banisar, 2006; Mendel, 
2008; UNESCO, 2016). Europe serves as a microcosm of this global diffusion— with first adoptions 
in Western Europe in the 1970s followed by a second wave from the CEE EU accession countries in 
the 1990s. Despite all 28 cases being covered in some way, there is an important variation on multiple 
dimensions. Most notably, these include the bodies covered, documents and/or information which is 
accessible, exemptions allowed for information types, fees to be charged, timescales that must be fol-
lowed; appeals process, oversight and investigation arrangements, and sanctions for refusal to grant 
information.
Finally, comes the Ombudsman. The term comes from Scandinavian languages and indicates a per-
son who works as a representative, an agent. The Ombudsman serves the diffuse interests in the polity 
by acting on behalf of these interests before administrative bodies in cases of maladministration and 
injustice. Early forms of this institution are documented since the 12th century but it is conventionally 
assumed that it took its modern form in Sweden at the beginning of the 19th century. Since then, dif-
ferent waves appeared (Gregory & Giddings, 2000). In the first wave, the Ombudsman spread across 
Scandinavia in early 20th century. But it is only in the post- war period, under the second and third 
waves, that the institution started its global diffusion, first across Western democracies and then across 
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new democracies. According to the International Ombudsman Institute,2 140 countries in the world 
have established an Ombudsman office.
When it comes to functions and mandate, the Ombudsman is an officer of the legislature vested with 
broad supervisory and investigative powers and jurisdiction over the public administration. As such, it 
is thought to promote accountability and protection of individual rights, ultimately fostering rule of law 
and democracy (Diamandouros, 2006). Key features of the office are independence, broad accessibility, 
vast latitude in terms of investigative powers, a largely informal role when it comes to the range of reme-
dies, which typically take the form of mediations/conciliations between the parties or recommendations 
issued to the investigated public authorities.
The Ombudsman usually lacks means to enforce its recommendations and issue sanctions. It follows 
that the implementation of Ombudsman's recommendations mainly depends on its moral suasion and 
the levels of trust and social capital in society. In Central and Eastern European countries the type and 
bite of the Ombudsman's remedies tend to be broader. Although barred from issuing sanctions on its 
own, the system of referrals of cases to judiciary or disciplinarian bodies strengthens the cogency of 
Ombudsman recommendations, making the office closer to courts.3
These four instruments have a common procedural nature. They start when an actor performs a 
given action, others respond, there are interactions, exchanges of information, choices and appeals, 
until, ultimately, an end point is reached and a decision made. By adopting the IGT, we conceptualize 
the four instruments as action situations where policy actors: inhabit roles, have rights, make choices, 
lodge complaints, and face consequences while drawing on information they access.
We therefore argue that nationwide, whole- of- government rulemaking procedures in a population of 
countries can be approached as empirical instances of rule types that constitute an action situation. We 
adopt the rule categorization aspect of IGT specifically. According to Ostrom, rule types are a classifica-
tion instrument, “a useful system for those interested in linking rules and the action situations (games) 
created by rules, the biophysical world, and communities” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 187). We postulate therefore 
that the design of a rulemaking procedure such as consultation or impact assessment constitute the suf-
ficient set of rules- in- form that shapes the “consultation/RIA action situations.” “Rules are part of the 
underlying structure that constitute a single- action situation or a series of them” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 179).
We further argue that the four selected procedures/instruments share the characteristic of open-
ing- up the public decision- making process to a range of interests. In other words, they share the prop-
erty of constraining bureaucratic action and enfranchising diffused interests through participation and 
transparency. The unifying element of these procedures, and what makes them shape up the regulatory 
policy process, is the sheer similarity we observe, across countries and procedures, in position rules 
(and the boundary rules which qualify them). In fact, along with highly certified bureaucratic actors 
like the drafting authority of consultation/IA, the information commissioner (IC) of FOI procedures 
or the Ombudsman, these participatory rulemaking procedures systematically assign a position to either 
citizens at large or qualified non- bureaucratic actors such as experts (in RIA), stakeholders (in consulta-
tion), or affected parties (in FOI and OM procedures).
Thus, the significance of the rule types lies in their role as markers of important steps when actors 
interact, become interdependent, or are requested to perform in an institutional setting (Schlager & Cox, 
2017). These interactions can be understood as comprised of the IGT seven rule types— position, bound-
ary, choice, aggregation, information, payoff, and scope (Ostrom, 2005, 2007, pp. 29– 30; see Box 1). 
Each of these seven types has a different manifestation in each of the four instruments (see Table 1 for 
exemplars). Empirically, our aim is to explore the balance of these seven types in each instrument across 
28 countries. Since we are interested in design, we look at rules- in- form only.
DATA AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Empirically, we find the rule types that constitute the design of the action situations in the legal 
base of the instruments and procedures. The IGT is eminently suitable for the collection of data and 
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analysis of formal laws (Ostrom, 2011, p. 18). Our legal base comprises laws (in the case of FOI and the 
Ombudsman) and guidance documents. In some countries RIA and consultation are not established by 
law, yet governments publish official guidance on how they should be carried out by officers in depart-
ments and agencies. Our “four- action- situations” strategy is consistent with the IGT literature that has 
examined networks of adjacent (McGinnis, 2011) and layered action situations (Möck et al., 2020).
To achieve the typological form of measuring implied by IGT's rule types, we worked with a team 
of 40 administrative lawyers. For each country, we identified the legal bases of the four instruments in 
force as of June 2018 (grounded in hard law or on soft guidance documents) and retrieved text in origi-
nal language and in English translation. Relevant portions of legal texts were gathered using a protocol 
based on Ostrom's rule types. Thus, when considering the guidance and/or law on consultation for 
country X we retrieved the exact text (articles, clauses, or entire sections) where positions are defined, 
boundaries set, information flows described, choice prescribed, and so on. Data collection was com-
pleted in December 2018, when the UK was still a member state of the EU.4
With these data, we address the following research questions about the rule structures and action 
situations we examine in the context of our population.5
RQ1 How do the four action situations differ in terms of rule types? To answer this ques-
tion we take the 28 countries as a single population containing 203 rules, distributed by 
IGT type.
RQ2 What are the features of the rules that best explain the variation in our population? 
The IGT provides a powerful and theoretically robust lens to observe the fine- grained (i.e., 
at the individual rule type level) variability of procedures. But, we are interested in going 
one step beyond simply mapping variation overall. Using Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) we uncover the key difference- making components of each instrument.
RQ3 Having identified the components that matter in explaining variation, we ask: how do 
countries align in relation to the components that best explain variation?
ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis considering the overall distribution of the rules by IGT types across the four 
instruments, ignoring for the moment country- level variation (Table 2).
BOX 1 Seven rules types
Rule type These rules …
Position Identify positions/roles to be filled by individual or collective actors
Boundary Regulate eligibility of actors to occupy positions
Choice Specify actions that actors must, must not, or may undertake
Aggregation Discipline actions or decisions that require the aggregation of two or more actors
Information Identify channels and modes of communication/exchange of information between actors
Payoff Assign benefits and costs— for example rewards and sanctions— to specific actors relative to 
distinct courses of action
Scope Identify required, desired, or prohibited outcomes of the action situation
Source: Carter et al. (2015, p. 163), Ostrom (2005, p. 190).
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The IGT sheds light on the structure of rules across the four instruments. Payoff and aggregation 
rules are rare in all cases. This points to limited reach in terms of scrutiny, oversight, sanctions, and 
rewards. The incentive structure is not based on tangible implications for government departments and 
agencies of not performing according to guidance or rewards for good practice. For example, the only 
aggregation moment for FOI concerns specialist cases of consultations with third parties when dealing 
with information that may impact adversely on them.
For the rest of the rule types, the picture is mixed. Position rules are a case in point. The design of 
FOI and Ombudsman displays conventional positions that determine who can participate. Take FOI: 
four positions recur: (a) the requestor (usually the public in some form), (b) a public authority, (c) a spe-
cialized information appellate body— usually called the IC, and (d) a designated information handler 
that sometimes exists in the bureau or within each public authority. The Ombudsman is similar with 
three clearly codified positions (the Ombudsman, the complainant, and the investigated public body). 
The degree of codification is lighter in RIA and consultation.
The position of who carries out the RIA ranges from the “individual officer,” the “competent ad-
ministration” (Estonia, Lithuania, Italy), the “initiator of the act or external contractor” (Romania) to 
more generic references to decision- making in cabinet (Spain). Specific RIA positions are sometimes 
assigned to Treasury (control on the costs of proposed legislation), the Ministry of Justice (control on the 
quality of legislation), the legal service (Cyprus), and independent regulators. In consultation, there is no 
identification of who exactly carries out the procedure in a number of countries, including Austria, the 
Czech Republic, and Denmark. By contrast, countries like Bulgaria define the position of “the drafting 
authority” with some precision— this authority can be a central government department or an indepen-
dent regulator. In federal countries, position rules include sub- national authorities.
FOI and the Ombudsman are heavy on boundary rules, whereas consultation and RIA set fewer 
barriers. Indeed, with FOI and Ombudsman we enter a world of conditions, exceptions, and exemptions 
where definite eligibility criteria are attached to each of the positions. In the case of FOI, for example, 
these rules offer precision on who can request and what constitutes a public authority and an IC. We 
also find the boundaries of the information and/or documents themselves. This is one of the central 
dimensions where FOI vary across the world— so- called class and harm tests. In essence, these cover 
the exemptions— which can be either mandatory or discretionary— to particular categories of infor-
mation (class) or information whose release is judged to risk harm to certain functions of the state. In 
Ombudsman procedures, boundaries to eligibility similarly apply to the complainant, in the form of 
demonstrating a personal interest/suffered violation and of filing the complaint within a specified time- 
frame (typically one year), and to the public administration, in the form of exempted bodies.
Choice rules feature strongly in all four instruments. For RIA and consultation, these rules refer 
to the steps of the procedures. These are mostly procedural- analytical steps and tests in RIA, such as 
measuring the baseline and examining more than one option. In consultation, choice rules deal with 
identification of parties, notification, consultation timetable, and other steps, including in some cases 
TA B L E  2  Rule numbers by instrument
Position Boundary Choice Aggregation Information Payoff Scope Total
Consultation 7 4 8 0 6 0 8 33
21.21% 12.12% 24.24% 0 18.18% 0 24.24% 100%
RIA 10 7 17 0 4 1 6 45
22.22% 15.56% 37.78% 0 8.89% 2.22% 13.33% 100%
FOIA 3 23 16 1 12 5 4 64
4.69% 35.94% 25% 1.56% 18.75% 7.81% 6.25% 100%
OM 2 17 26 3 8 4 1 61
3.28% 27.87% 40.98% 4.92% 13.11% 6.56% 1.64% 100%
Source: Authors' own.
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(e.g., Bulgaria) seeking experts' opinions. In FOI, for requestors, obligations, and rights revolve around 
information re- use and appeals. For public authorities, disclosure actions, rules of engagement with the 
requestor, reporting requirements, and obligations in the appeals process all have prominence here. 
Where an ICO exists, choice rules concern the nature of their decision- making— binding or not— the 
extent of their powers and, again, reporting activities. In the Ombudsman, where we see the greatest 
number (41%), they mainly reflect two key aspects of the procedure. First, the investigative functions 
of the Ombudsman which trigger the relational aspect of the action situation. Second, the overarching 
dimension of remedies. Indeed, the accountability potential of the Ombudsman is muted lacking clear 
rules which discipline the means through which cases of maladministration or violation of individual 
rights can be mended. This is also the reason why the Ombudsman is comparatively the instrument 
featuring most aggregation and payoff rules (although few).
As we would expect from an information tool, FOI information rules are abundant. They cover a 
vast range of details regarding the timing, format, record management procedures, and the clarity of the 
process. But all procedures contemplate information rules, given that they are contingent on increasing 
transparency, notifying, giving reasons, and displaying evidence utilized by the government and the 
regulators.
Finally, turning to scope rules, statements on the overall aims and outcomes to be achieved are 
scarce in instruments grounded in codified law— that is, FOI and Ombudsman. Discussions about the 
scope of the instrument are found in the legislative and political debates that pre- date the instruments' 
design and enactment. For consultation and RIA, the picture on scope rules is different. As instruments 
set in guidelines rather than law, motivations and aims are recorded to underline their importance. 
Consultation in particular is the instrument through which governments send signals and generate ex-
pectations about the involvement of a range of interests and preferences that by design are enfranchised. 
In contrast to other ways of influencing the legislator or rule- maker, consultation is where the legal base 
provides for access to draft rules of “any citizen,” “interests not directly affected” and “citizens of other 
countries that may be affected” (this wording occurs in the legal base). This is also the procedure with 
the lowest number of rules, which signals the presence of degrees of freedom in how to carry out con-
sultation as well as reflecting the fact that consultation guidance is generally short and, in many cases, 
embedded in the RIA procedure.
We now examine the key dimensions of variation in each policy instrument, commencing with 
consultation (Table 3). We do this through four principal component analyses (PCAs), one for each 
instrument. PCA is an exploratory dimension reduction technique which allows for the reduction of re-
dundant information and the identification of principal components. The latter are computed as orthog-
onal linear transformations of the original manifest variables and are used to reveal a simpler internal 
structure of the data. The type of PCA we have employed maximize the variance in the data as we want 
our principal components to represent those dimensions that most explain variation across our cases. 
We discuss our approach and the individual components of each instruments (and what they mean) in 
the Appendix.
Variation in consultation designs is driven by two components that capture fundamental features of 
this instrument as well as the importance of certain types of rules (Table 3). PC1 is about commitment. 
We identify a first “background rule” that is not captured by Ostrom's type but is essential in our case, 
because we are dealing with two different approaches to consultation. Some countries follow the formal 
approach, based on provisions contained in either hard law or soft law, or in some cases both. These 
provisions describe the steps and actions of the government during consultation, no matter what sector 
is considered. The other set of countries comprises the cases of informality as guiding principle for 
consultation and cases where there is no consultation.
The second rule of PC1 is an IGT choice that commits the departments or agencies to the production 
of a timetable at the beginning of each consultation. Some countries do not have a rule- type like this 
because the timetable is uniform for all consultations and fixed by law or government's decision (UK). 
Others do not have the timetable rule because departments and agencies organize consultation with 
some flexibility and informality (Sweden). The third rule is about the provision of information relevant 
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for the overall credibility of the exercise, that is, the drafting authority publishes a report at the end 
of consultation showing how the comments raised by the stakeholders were taken into consideration. 
Together, these three rules signal the commitment of the government to consultation— hence the label 
of this component. In IGT language, commitment is a combination of uniform cross- sector standards 
that create expectations about the process, choice, and information.
PC2 is straightforward: it is about the IGT category of scope. We find three scope rules. They open 
up consultation to interests that otherwise would not be considered— the interests of those who are 
not directly affected, who would be discriminated, and who would not understand draft legislation be-
cause of technical language. We said earlier on that the design of consultation is among other things a 
signal. To employ words like the ones captured by the three scope rules sends a signal of openness and 
non- discrimination.
The distribution of countries on the two components is portrayed in the X/Y plot in Figure 1.
We find that most countries cluster on the lower quadrants, meaning that few countries invest in 
scope rules. Italy, Cyprus, and the UK are in the upper part of the figure, but in different positions in 
relation to PC2. The case of Italy is one of investment in scope rules but not in commitment. We suggest 
this is indicative of a flowery language without specific obligations (Italy is low on PC2). The Republic 
of Cyprus has high scores on both scope and commitment. The legal base for consultation is indeed one 
of the richest we have found in our population— it contains an obligation to write thank you letters to 
those who have taken part in the exercise. This over- presence of rules, when confronted with the prac-
tice in Cyprus (OECD, 2019, Chapter 2; personal communications with our Project Expert for Cyprus, 
May 2020) suggests “communication out of character.” The legal base communicates an idealistic con-
sultation that is at odds with reality.
In the lower part of the figure and to the east we find countries that have historically championed 
informal consultation, quite different from “better regulation” OECD- style (Dunlop et al., 2020) either 
because of informality (Denmark, see Radaelli, 2010b) or corporatism (Austria). Sweden has its own 
approach— based on delegation of consultation on secondary legislation to regulatory authorities and, 
F I G U R E  1  Principal components 1 and 2— plots by instrument
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for primary legislation, consultation via committees of inquiry and hearings. This approach does not 
contemplate the steps and formalities presupposed by the typical OECD and EU practice (Radaelli, 
2009, 2010b).
The south- west quadrant displays 12 countries that have high scores of commitment and low values 
on scope. We read this first of all as evidence of convergence across systems that do not share historical 
traits in terms of diffusion of administrative law or membership of the EU— both a founding member 
of the EU (Germany) and the most recent entrant (Croatia) are in this group. Consultation as portrayed 
in the map does not follow any conventional narrative. The countries are not displayed in ways that 
resemble our knowledge of pressure group systems (social dialog and corporatism versus pluralism) and 
old- new member states of the EU. And second, the map points to a prevalence of commitment over 
declaratory functions of the legal base.
We now examine the components of RIA (Table 3 and the X/Y plot on RIA in Figure 1). PC1 has 
a clearly discernible IGT value: it is about the boundaries. It is made up of four types of exceptions— 
cases in which the government does not have to carry out an impact assessment. Exceptions are the 
most important boundary rule. There are few boundaries of the “who” of impact assessment— generally 
the position rule is the line department. Instead, the boundaries concern the “what,” that is, the RIA.
As for PC2, it gathers two analytical requirements. RIA as procedure requires departments to under-
take a range of tests and analyses, from the initial identification of the status quo to the comparison of 
alternative feasible options. Our component assembles the initial test on the status quo— which in the 
legal base is sometimes described as identification of the current regulatory- legal base, or definition of 
the problem that needs to be addressed— and the benefit- cost principle or criterion. In our population, 
the latter is not formal benefit- cost analysis, but rather a requirement to commensurate positive and 
negative impacts, or take into consideration some categories of qualitative benefits, or justify costs with 
the benefits accruing from the chosen option (or from a range of feasible options). The IGT lens shows 
the nature of choice rules of PC2.
PC3, which we label “responsibility” is about “who” carries out the RIA— in some cases the legal 
base is silent, assuming that RIA shall be done, but without clarifying who exactly will take responsibil-
ity. The publication of draft RIAs is another step that points toward responsibility. Some governments 
do not publish RIA because either do not have this instrument (except that in special sectors like the 
environment or for a type of companies, such as Malta with the Small Business Act) or because the 
process of appraising the likely effects of proposals is not formal. In IGT terms, PC3 is a combination 
of position and information rules.
Turning to the distribution of countries portrayed in the second X/Y plot in Figure 1, the design 
of RIA is analytical (PC2) and carried out across the board (PC1) in seven countries that differ by ad-
ministrative traditions and experience. Our communications with the Project Experts in Romania and 
Hungary point to the likelihood of “communication out of character.” The legal base was inspired by 
the OECD- EU principles of regulatory reform; however, there are administrative capacity issues on 
the ground in these two countries (World Bank, 2015; Personal communications with Project Experts 
February 2020). In the north- west quadrant, the countries are more distanced. Here RIA is not carried 
out across the board, but when it is done it is comprehensive. Boundaries may then signal sector- level 
meticulous guidelines (e.g., the gas and electricity sectors in Italy).
The south- west quadrant signals low density of IGT rules (at least as far as the first two components 
are portrayed). The boundaries are low because the RIA procedure is barely sketched (Belgium, Malta, 
Luxembourg) and because there is a preference for rules- in- use rather than rules- in- form (Finland).
Variation in FOI legislation is accounted for by two features— the presence, powers, and paperwork 
associated with a dedicated independent supervisory body (IC) that may exist as an audience for appeals 
and the boundaries concerning what documents and/or information can exempted from disclosure.
PC1 comprises eight variables revealing the pivotal importance of the IC position. Central to the IC 
operation are the choice rules attached to that role and specifically, whether: its decisions are binding; 
it has inspection powers; and it must report annually to the legislature. Added to this, information rules 
concerning the existence of a delineated appeal process and timeline account for diversity. Finally, we 
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have a single- scope rule usually associated with the IC as an engine for the sharing of best practice. In 
short, this is a microcosmic action situation concerning the operation (or not) of a dedicated FOI ap-
peals that process within the overall instrumentation.
PC2 and PC3 underline the importance of the presence or absence clauses in the law that exempt 
information— harm and class tests. FOI legislation contains an array of these tests, but this analysis cuts 
through the complexity. PC2 shows that one set of boundaries that matter is the absence of discretion-
ary harm tests across five main categories (Blanke & Perlingeiro, 2018, pp. 33– 38; Muscar & Cottier, 
2017; OECD, 2011). These are, harm to persons, international relations, commercial competitiveness, 
economic interests, and the activities of law enforcement agencies. PC3 similarly focuses attention on 
the boundary rules that dominate FOI. This time we are dealing with the presence or absence of tests 
around entire classifications of information and whether these are mandatory (in relation to national 
security and economic competitiveness) and discretionary (in relation to national security, personal data 
and commercial confidentiality).
The data suggest that the mix of other rules— choice, information, and scope— matters but only as 
they relate to the presence or absence of one position— the IC. Despite the fact that scope rules account 
for only 6% of the FOI content analyzed and are rare in this policy instrument, they do matter in con-
nection to the presence of an IC to operationalize them. And, while information rules are in abundance 
in FOI legislation (accounting for nearly a fifth of our data structure) they do not drive cross- national 
variation even though there is a good deal of diversity in these rules across the 28 cases. Rather, their 
importance relates only to the issue of appeals.
Staying on the theme of surprises, when we consider the legal literature on FOI legislative design, 
there are some variables that are assumed to make a difference between countries but just do not figure 
here (despite considerable cross- national variation). These include: whether the legal text gives request-
ors access to both information and specific administrative documents (Dragos et al., 2019); the presence 
of a so- called public interest over- ride invoked as a final check before exceptions are applied (Banisar, 
2006); the presence of fees for information access (Banisar, 2006); the sanctions imposed for violations 
of FOI legislation (Blanke & Perlingeiro, 2018, pp. 58– 60).
When we look at the two main FOI components, the 28 cases fall into distinct zones (FOI X/Y plot 
in Figure 1). Taking the bird's eye view, as we move eastward we encounter countries with an IC whose 
powers are considerable and with an appeal process whose rules are clear (the ideal type being the UK6). 
As we move northward, we find fewer and eventually no discretionary harm tests (the archetype being 
Sweden). The north- west quadrant contains the largest concentration of countries— nine in total. Eight 
countries lack any dedicated IC, and there is an (almost total) absence of discretionary harm tests in 
the five main areas (with the exception of Italy which invokes these tests for documentation relation to 
personal affairs and commercial confidentiality). Though Germany does have the position of IC, it has 
none of the powers or explication of appeals process we see in countries in the eastern side of the figure.
The four countries in the north- east quadrant are united by the presence of dedicated IC— some with 
binding powers and other not (Hungary and Spain). For almost all, discretionary harm tests in the five 
main areas (Ireland excepted which retains the right to withhold documents it judges may harm national 
economic competitiveness).
The south- east quadrant has only three countries. Here, discretionary harm tests in the main areas 
exist (with the exception of Cyprus which has three of the five tests) combined with a dedicated IC with 
considerable and binding powers in all cases.
The six countries in the south- west quadrant have discretionary harm tests in the five main areas but 
do not have a dedicated IC. With the exception of Austria and Belgium, appeals in these countries are 
made through the administrative courts and/or Ombudsman procedures.
When we lift our gaze from the specifics, and compare the countries found in each quadrant, the 
analysis offers some unexpected affinities. For example, in the north- west quadrant, we find member 
states from different regions and different times of EU accession— Scandinavia (Sweden), Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania), the Baltics (Latvia, Lithuania), Southern 
Europe (Greece), and founding EU countries (Germany, Italy). Such diversity undermines any notions 
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we might have about carbon copying of legislation taking place during waves of EU enlargement. 
Moreover, the plot also questions notions of tools based on legal families— for example, the north- east 
and south- east zones each contain mixed of civil (Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Spain) and common 
law countries (Cyprus, Ireland, and UK).
One reason for this varied picture, and apparently unlikely affinities between countries, is the polit-
icized nature of the development of FOI legislation. This is a high salience administrative tool whose 
legislative development and design is subject to intense and forensic scrutiny by a diverse range of policy 
actors, as shown by Worthy (2017) with reference to Britain. The result is a legislation which is not car-
bon copied from neighboring jurisdictions or drawn down from legal principles alone.
The key sources of variation in Ombudsman broadly confirm our expectations. PC1, explaining 
more than one fourth of the overall variance, puts together two choice rules and one information 
rule. They concern the remedial dimension and the dialectic relationship that unfolds between the 
Ombudsman and the public bodies to which recommendations are addressed. This is not a surprise: 
choice and information rules represent together more than the 53% of all Ombudsman rule types. The 
IGT implications are clear: the procedural aspect of Ombudsman recommendations (also including the 
exchange of information between the parties after the decision of the Ombudsman) is the most promi-
nent in explaining variation in design.
The distribution of cases along PC1 confirms this intuition since it reveals the existence of the 
expected divide between political systems where the oversight potential of Ombudsman procedures is 
expressed though informality and high mutual trust between the parties (mainly old democracies) and 
systems where the Ombudsman is vested with quasi- judiciary coercive prerogatives (mainly new democ-
racies). This divide corroborates the argument about different waves of diffusion of the Ombudsman 
institutions (Gregory & Giddings, 2000) with late (and harder) adopters clustering in the right part of 
the X/Y plot.
PC2 puts together different forms of accountability. On the one hand, accountability of the 
Ombudsman vis- à- vis, not only the body that appoints her, but also the public at large. The publicity 
of the Ombudsman annual reports, in fact, typically brings to the fore all the cases of maladministra-
tion treated by the office before the Parliament and the public. This provides incentives for further 
usage by the public (Diamandouros, 2006) and constitutes a form of “name and shame” for the public 
bodies whose actions were reprimanded, even lacking manifest hard sanctions. The second form of 
accountability has to do with the boundaries of the Ombudsman jurisdiction, namely its jurisdiction 
over private bodies performing public functions. Clearly, countries that allow for both publicity of 
Ombudsman reports and coverage of private entities (upper quadrants of the X/Y plot) score strong 
in terms of accountability toward different positions. Finally, PC3 includes eligibility criteria to access 
the Ombudsman (boundary rules). Personal interest (and not time boundaries) remains a cornerstone 
of Ombudsman's discipline variability, as well as the incompatibility of Ombudsman investigations with 
judicial procedures. The IGT implications of components two and three are less neat, but note that three 
of the four original variables loading into these components are boundary rules, bringing us back to our 
expectations about the centrality of choice and boundary rules for highly proceduralized and codified 
instruments.
The X/Y plot of Ombudsman PCs points to low degrees of clustered convergence. Starting from 
the south- west quadrant, Italy and the UK stand out. Although their designs are different, for the sake 
of PC1 (remedies) and PC2 (accountability) they are functionally equivalent. Italy only has regional in-
stitutions, without a central Ombudsman. In the UK, the access to the Ombudsman is filtered by MPs, 
the set of available remedies is limited to non- binding recommendations and a vast number of regional/
local and sectorial Ombudsman institutions exist.
Moving up (north- west quadrant), the countries remain quite distanced with no clear clustering. Yet, 
among them, we find four Scandinavian and Western/Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands). These countries belong to the first wave of diffusion of the Ombudsman insti-
tution and are (still) loyal to the original template: strong on accountability while drawing on informal 
and non- binding remedies.
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The north- east quadrant, where accountability mechanisms are coupled with harder forms of rec-
ommendations, is the most populated with 14 countries. The two groups of countries observed in 
this quadrant defy classifications like waves of diffusion and legal traditions. In fact, along with new 
democracies (mainly grouping in the right- end side of the plot— as noted above) we find countries like 
France, Austria, and Finland. The lesson we draw is that the IGT's comparative logic, aptly expressed 
in our analysis through orthogonal/uncorrelated components, is truly configurational. As such, one 
aspect/dimension of policy design highlighted by IGT may converge with existing assumptions and 
taxonomies, while other may allow us to detect surprising similarities in design (like in the two groups 
of the north- west quadrant).
Finally, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania are in the south- east quadrant where the hardening of 
Ombudsman's remedies is coupled with weak accountability mechanisms. Interestingly, these are also 
the only countries where the Ombudsman is allowed some form of direct sanctioning, indicating a 
potential (and dangerous) trade- off between direct enforcement mechanisms and accountability rules.
CONCLUSIONS
Our major theoretical result lies in using the IGT as lens to correctly identify the variables that matter 
in the design of four policy instruments (beyond the idyonsincracies of each instrument), derive meas-
urement from theory, and deploy measurement across 28 countries to unveil suprising patterns and 
components that explain variation. Our challenges were to capture the structure of diverse policy in-
struments, avoid the pitfalls of value- laden categories, and create regulatory indicators for cross- country 
comparison. Our analysis is the first to combine the IGT with PCA to inform us about the features that 
matter most in explaining variation.
The IGT enabled granular analysis in three directions: we examined the distribution of rule types in 
the population as a whole, the IGT structure of each instrument, and the variation across 28 cases as 
accounted for by IGT rules. The PCAs generated coherent principal components that sharpen the IGT 
focus on rule types. The results often deviate from conventional comparative politics categories about 
civil and common law countries, varieties of capitalism, strength of pressure groups, Europeanization, 
and waves of accession to the EU. Actually, the empirical results have challenged and ultimately changed 
our priors on cross- country variation. This, we submit, is because the comparative politics priors are 
suitable for macro- comparisons. When it comes to administrative law, regulation and specific policy 
instruments the explanation we found is more nuanced and, as we said, granular. This new knowledge 
is an important contribution to the literature on regulation.
In terms of diagnostics and policy recommendations, the IGT exposes incomplete or weak designs. 
The institutional designs are, from an Ostromian point of view, incomplete. Specifically, across all four 
instruments, we lack inputs from an array of interests (aggregation) and rewards/sanctions (payoffs). 
Policy- makers involved in policy reform should give serious consideration to the overall balance of 
institutional design across all four instruments.
Another contribution is that we considered together the four policy instruments, something that 
is completely original, both in the field of IGT and in the field of regulation. Future research could 
go even further and examine the inter- relations and ecological relationships among the instruments. 
Consultation and RIA, on the one hand, and FOI and Ombudsman, on the other, have affinities. 
Together, the four meso action situations define a macro action situation. This article provides the 
foundations for scaling- up from meso to macro. One can also build on this approach shifting to the 
diagnostic mode to explore how these instrument types and mixes affect socially important governance 
outcomes. For this, we need to combine rules- in- form with rules- in- use.
This last observation brings us to the limitations. One is that we looked at rules- in- form only, ex-
cluding rules- in- use. Another is that we did not consider the court procedures to scrutinize regulatory 
decisions. Additonally, we did not set up research questions with an hypothesis- testing orientation. Our 
approach served us well in demonstrating the potential of the classification in terms of rule types for 
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explanatory, hypothesis- testing research that will take place in the future years. Future research should 
also include the time dimension and appraise the role of the EU institutions in shaping policy design 
over time, especially in terms of waves of accession.
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EN DNOT ES
 1. Rule types are conceived, among other reasons “to understand how action situations are constructed, […] to cope with the 
immense diversity of  rules by clustering them into seven generic rules and […] to study the underlying universality of  rules” 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 175).
 2. https://www.theioi.org/the- i- o- i.
 3. The judicialization of  the Ombudsman office may also reflects an objective weakness of  the judiciary branch in Central and 
Eastern European countries (Gregory and Giddings, 2000).
 4. More detail on the data collection are presented in Section 1 of  the Appendix.
 5. This population is diverse in terms of  administrative law traditions, efficiency of  public administration, waves of  European-
ization, models of  capitalism and institutional change— with the Eastern European institutions having experienced the change 
from communist rule to democracy.
 6. We should be clear that despite using the UK label, the legislation coded for this study is the FOI legislation for England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland Freedom of  Information Act 2000). Owing to its distinct legal system (combination of  common and 
civil law) public authorities in Scotland are covered by separate legislation though it is similar (Freedom of  Information [Scot-
land] Act 2002).
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